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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
vantages accruing thereto. It guarantees a degree of jus-
tice seldom, if ever, approached in the application of the
harsh and strict Federal rule. It makes for certainty where
otherwise only uncertainty would exist."
ACTION IN MARYLAND FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
CAUSED AND OCCURRING ELSEWHERE-
DAVIS V. RUZICKA'
An action was brought in Maryland by an administra-
trix for the wrongful death of her intestate caused and
occurring in the District of Columbia. The Death Statute
of the District2 enables the personal representative of the
deceased to sue for the benefit of the next of kin and limits
recovery to $10,000. The Maryland Death Statute author-
izes a suit in the name of the State for the benefit of certain
relatives in proportions to be determined by the jury and
with no limit as to the amount of recovery.' This is the
Maryland statute of the Lord Campbell's Act type which
provides compensation to near relatives for the loss of the
benefits calculated to result to them from the continued
living of the deceased. Another Maryland statute4 enables
the personal representative of the deceased to sue for the
benefit of the estate for such injuries and suffering as were
sustained by the deceased in his life time, viz., suffering
between the time of the fatal injury and death. This latter
type of action is not involved in the instant case. The Court
of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the defendant, stating
that suit may be brought in Maryland for a wrongful death
elsewhere only where the statute of the jurisdiction where
the injury and death occurred is similar in its design and
purpose to that of Maryland.
" To bolster the conclusion reached it is interesting to notice the lan-
guage in the case of Heironimus v. Sweeney, 83 Md. 146, 159, 34 Atl. 823
(1896). There the Court, in discussing various views, had this to say,
"Other Courts have held that although the money obtained under ultra
vires contracts must be returned to the party to whom it rightfully be-
longs; yet an action cannot be maintained on the contract itself." The
Court then cites several Supreme Court cases in support of this doctrine,
and then continues, "But whether an action is brought on the contract
or the equitable grounds which show that the plaintiff ought ex aequo et
bono to recover, the object which the law seeks to accomplish is the same."
I - Md. -, 183 Atl. 569 (1936).
District of Columbia Code, Title 21, Secs. 1-3.
'Md. Code and Code Supp., Art. 67, Secs. 1, 2.
'Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 106. See also Md. Code Supp., Art. 75,
Sec. 29.
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The Court felt bound by its similar decisions in Ash v. B.
& 0. R. R. Co.,' and London Guarantee and Accident Co. v.
Balgowan Steamship Co.,6 .
The Maryland doctrine is in accord with a group of early
cases decided when there was a tendency to restrict the en-
forcement of so-called foreign-created rights, including
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Richards.' It is opposed, however, by
more modern cases, Dennick v. Central R. R. of New
Jersey,8 and Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York.9 It
is likewise opposed by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,"
and the uniform views of the commentators in the field."
These take the stand that the claim for wrongful death, like
other tort claims, is to be governed by the law of the place of
wrong without regard to the similarity of the statutes (sub-
ject of course, to applicable general exceptions such as are
found in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws). 2 Nor does
the Maryland Court's strict application of the similarity
doctrine accord with the majority of those cases stating the
rule in the same terms. The general tendency is to follow
the fundamental Conflict of Laws policy of recognition and
to look to the similarity of the purpose of the statutes in-
volved and overlook procedural and non-substantial differ-
ences such as have been taken as sufficient to bar recovery in
Maryland.'8
It should be observed that the United States Supreme
Court, while adhering to the doctrine of similarity of stat-
utes, has followed the liberal view of overlooking technical
dissimilarities. In Stewart v. B. c 0. R. R. Co.,14 among
other cases, it has sustained a suit in the District of Colum-
bia for a wrongful death occurring in Maryland. Likewise,
the United States District Court for Maryland, in treating
5 72 Md. 144, 19 At. 643 (1890).
0 161 Md 145, 155 Ati. 334, 77 A. L. R. 1302 (1931) (noted in (1931) 80
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 128). Cf. Dronenburg v. Harris, 108 Md. 597, 608, 71 Atl.
81 (1908).
' 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 627 (1887) and collection of cases 56 L. R. A. 202,
203, note.
8 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. Ed. 439 (1880).
0 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
"0 Sec. 392 (a).
11 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, sees. 99-102; Beale, Conflict of Laws, secs.
391-392; Rose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death (1935)
33 Mich. L. Rev. 545; Note, Conflict of Laws, Enforcement of Death by
Wrongful Act Statutes in Courts of Another State (1933) 13 B. U. L. Rev.
521.
"Sees. 607-620.
3Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 41 Ill. App. 116 (1891); Stewart v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 42 L. Ed. 537, 18 S. Ct. 105 (1897)
Annotation, 77 A. L. R. 1311.
uSupra note 13.
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the matter as one of general law which the Federal courts
must determine for themselves, has allowed recovery 5 for
a wrongful death in West Virginia under the same statutes
which had been held too dissimilar by the Maryland Court
in Ash v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.'6
This note has confined its statements to the general
broad principle of recognition or non-recognition of foreign
death claims and the doctrine of similarity of statutes called
for by the Maryland cases, without attempting to indicate
other difficulties in securing recognition of the foreign death
claims, such as the penal character of the law of the place of
injury, right of action given to a party who could not sue in
the forum, etc. Discussion of such phases appears in the
various secondary sources referred to above, a close reading
of which will reveal an ever increasing tendency on the part
of courts to liberalize along the lines of a broader recogni-
tion of foreign claims, even to the extent of reversing
directly or indirectly former holdings. Instances of the
latter are seen in several cases. 7
The Maryland Court's adherence to the similarity doc-
trine results in it being possible for tortfeasors from other
states to escape liability for wrongful deaths caused by them
by simply removing their property and persons to the safe
haven of M1aryland. One basic peculiarity of our wrongful
death statute (noninal action in the name of the State as
plaintiff) may cause our statute to be held dissimilar to the
statutes of almost all other states. Thus it may be that
Maryland provides a haven of refuge for the persons and
property of those who come here after killing people else-
where. For, assuming lack of requisite "similarity" of
statute, the only hope that the next of kin of the victim can
have is to sue the tortfeasor in a state (if any) where per-
sonal judgment may be rendered against him, and then to
sue him in Maryland upon that judgment in order to have
access to his property located in Maryland.
One writer on the general subject," writing at a time
when the London Guarantee case was the latest Maryland
case on the subject, had this to say about the similarity doc-
15Weissengoff v. Davis, 20 F. 16 (1919).
'5Supra note 5.
"Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, note 9; Richardson v. New York
Central R. R., 98 Mass. 851 (1867) ; Walsh v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co., 160
Mass. 571, 573, 36 N. E. 584, 39 Am. St. Rep. 514 (1893) ; Hanlon v. Leyland
& Co. Ltd., 223 Mass. 438, 111 N. E. 907, L. R. A. 1917 A., 34 (1916) ; Daury
v. Ferraro, 108 Conn. 386, 143 Ati. 630 (1928) ; Wellman v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322,
107 Atl. 396 (1919).
IsRose, Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death (1935) 33
Mich. L. Rev. 545, 560-1.
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trine: ". . . the rule persists merely as one of the law's
anachronisms which should be consigned to the limbo of
time-worn dogma." For a footnote to this statement, this
writer remarked about the doctrine and about the London
Guarantee case: "But, alas, even so moribund a doctrine
is not thus easily relegated. In a recent Maryland case
(the London Guarantee case) it appears as serenely as
though the light of modern legal reasoning had not dis-
owned it."
It would seem that the situation is ripe for statutory
reform. Why should not there be a statute passed per-
mitting suits to be brought in Maryland to collect damages
for the wrongful death of persons occurring elsewhere?
Such a statute could well provide rules for resolving
problems of dissimilarity, so long as the law applicable to
the tort should afford a substantial right of action for the
death.' 9 In the event of statutory reform to repeal the rule
of Davis v. Ruzicka and its precedent cases, thought might
well be given also to reforming the internal details of our
own wrongful death laws. Is there any real argument for
preserving the distinction between the separate actions for
the death itself and for the suffering endured by the victim
between the time of the fatal accident and the ensuing
death? For that matter, what justification is there for the
present rule requiring the action of the former type to be
brought in the name of the state as nominal plaintiff?
VENUE OF SUIT AGAINST DOMESTIC CORPORA-
TION. M. J. GROVE LIME CO. V. WOLFENDEN.1
The M. J. Grove Lime Company, a Maryland corporation
having its principal office in Frederick County, was sued in
the Superior Court of Baltimore City for damages arising
out of an automobile accident in Frederick County. The
sole activities of the corporation in Baltimore City consisted
of the solicitation of orders, which were subsequently ac-
19 The statute proposed by the Bar Association of Baltimore City, Daily
Record, February 2, 1937, and Ibid., February 3, 1937, does not go this
far. It merely seeks to make it possible to bring suits In Maryland for
wrongful deaths caused elsewhere. It provides that the "Courts of this
State shall apply the law of such other State, District of Columbia, or
territory of the United States, to the facts of the particular case, as
though such foreign law were the law of this state . . ." and that local
rules of pleading and procedure shall apply to the end that they shall
"give effect to the rights and obligations created by and existing under
the laws of the foreign jurisdiction..." where the tort occurred.
SMd.- , 188 Atl. 794 (1937).
